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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CATALYSTS IN WEST
AFRICA: INTERACTIONS WITH LOCAL CONTENT
LAWS AND INDUSTRY-COMMUNITY
AGREEMENTS
IBIRONKE

I.

T. ODuMosu-AYANU*
INTRODUCTION

This article analyzes select West African countries' policy and legal
initiatives for attracting and protecting foreign direct investment

("FDI"). It analyzes the relationship between investment promotion
and protection mechanisms, and initiatives that governments adopt to
facilitate the participation of local actors in sectors with dominant foreign presence. It also contrasts these investment promotion and protection mechanisms with industry-community initiatives that promote

interaction between FDI and local communities in Ghana and Nigeria, often as a way of facilitating socio-economic development. Prominent among development theories are neo-liberal perspectives on
economic development advocated inter alia by international financial
institutions. These neoliberal perspectives have been critiqued by approaches that challenge the idea of development and the way it is currently conceived.' Using lessons from engagements between these
often-conflicting approaches to socio-economic development as a
background, this article focuses on concrete approaches to foreign investment law-at-work in the lives of people, especially poor people.
The history of the international economic order invites cautious optimism or even cynicism about the role of (formal) law in economic
development. To observe that law is Janus-faced is not a novel obser* LLB (Hons) (Lagos), LLM (Calg.), PhD (UBC); Assistant Professor, College of Law,
University of Saskatchewan. Many thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada for providing research funds for this project, to Benjamin Omoruyi for research assistance, and to Robin Hansen, Jalia Kangave and Richard Oppong for valuable comments on drafts of this paper. An early version of this article was presented on April 13, 2012 at
the R.J. Reynolds' Symposium - Obstacles and Opportunities: The Role of Law in Doing Business in New and Old Economies in the Global Marketplace, hosted by the North Carolina Central University School of Law, Durham, United States.
1. See Gustavo Esteva, Development, in Tini Di viiani'MENii DiurIONAIY 6 (Wolfgang
Sachs ed., Univ. of Witwatersrand Press, 1993)(1992); ARtURo Es onAR, ENCOuNTIFRING DiViLI )I'
NT: Tiii MAKING AND UNMAKING OiF Tll: TIniiRD Woi o (1995). For an analysis of

radical perspectives on development, see Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing
Development, 22 Wis. IN i'. L.J. 1 (2004).
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vation and its mixed encounters with economic development themes
are evident. Law both creates and could remedy oppression.2 Some of
Africa's development challenges are results of laws that did not, and
still do not, favour Africans. These laws include some unfavourable
international economic laws, some domestic colonial laws enforced by
colonial administrators, autocratic rules devised under military regimes, and certain economic policies including some structural adjustment policies enforced under domestic laws. Yet, the law has also
demonstrated its ability to reverse oppressive situations. But the law is
not a panacea for all socio-economic challenges that African countries, or any other group of states, face. Questions of economic development are not only settled in law. They simultaneously involve issues
of politics, economics, social justice and others. To retain its relevance,
the law must engage these issues on a sophisticated level in order to
fully encompass thoughts from all these arenas. As demonstrated in
this article, foreign investment law in some West African countries is
moving in this direction.
African countries are actively seeking FDI.' Favourable legal instruments and policies' are part of the methods by which these countries work towards attracting FDI to their territories. 6 While
governments work towards promoting FDI, there are reports that FDI
2. See lbironke T. Odumosu, Challenges for the (Present) Future of Ihird World Approaches to International Law, 10 INT') ComM. L.R. 467 (2008).
3. On the colonial origins of international law see generally, ANroNY ANOIII, IMPilRIAIISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND '1i1 MAKING 01 INIilRNATIONAI. LAw (2004).

4. The commitment to attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is evident in the rapid
rate at which investment promotion treaties are concluded, old policies of indigenization are
reversed, policies of liberalization and privatization are instituted, investment promotion and
protection legislation are enacted, and constitutional protections are provided for investment in
African countries.
5. See Amanda Perry, Effective Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment: In Search of

the Evidence, 49 INi'i. & CoMir. L.Q. 779 (2000); lbironke T. Odumosu, Towards Mechanisms
for Assessing the Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment Law and Policy in Post-Conflict Rwanda,
in FORI(,N DiRii

i INvESTMi

Ni IN PosT-CONiLiic

COUNTRIEs 157 (Virtus Igbokwe et al, eds.,

2010) [hereinafter Odumosu, FDI Law and Policy in Post-Conflict Rwanda]. See also Jacque
Morisset, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Policiesalso Matter, in OR(;. io E((IN. Co-oI'iRATiiON AND Div., GLOHAL FoRUM ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: Niw HoRIZONS Eo FOREIGN DIREc INVESTMi 'NT 167 (2002).
6. The impact of legal instruments, especially bilateral investment treaties (BITs), in attracting FDI has been the focus of legal commentary. See Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit ...

and They Could Bite (World Bank, Working

Paper No. 3121, 2003), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/
1813-9450-3121; Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the
Business Environment in Developing Countries:The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties(Yale

Law Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 293, 2005), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=557121; Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries?, 33 Womii
Di-v. 1567 (2005). See
also U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Tin Roi i oi lNiiRNATIONAL INVESIMENi AcRiEMiNTS IN ATERAC-iHiNGI FoRIGN DiRic i INVi siMINT
available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20095 en.pdf.
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is not necessarily contributing as much to economic development as
expected.' For some West African countries that attract FDI, inflows
are received, profits are made, and these profits are repatriated without much impact on the local economy and people.' While governments adopt policies to attract FDI, sometimes there are not many
policies that ensure that FDI makes valuable contributions to the
economy and the lives of African people. In response to the challenges regarding the quality of FDI, some government action is being
taken to ensure that received investments generate significant benefits
locally. In this regard, this article analyzes the local content policies
and legislation of Ghana and Nigeria. Private actors - industry and
local communities - are also making arrangements for ensuring mutual benefits in the foreign investor and local communities'
relationship.
This article, the first in a series of articles that interrogate the engagements of local communities within the foreign investment regime,
analyzes investment promotion policies and legislation, and local participation-focused arrangements, in three interconnected parts. First,
using Nigeria and Ghana as examples, it briefly outlines the major
legal and policy initiatives for attracting FDI in these West African
countries. Second, this article analyzes two methods of making FDI
responsive to local conditions in order to facilitate economic development: government-led local content laws and community development
agreements ("CDAs"). Third, it investigates the compatibility of legal
instruments for attracting FDI and the instruments designed to ensure
that FDI is responsive to local conditions. Ultimately, the question is
whether West African countries are able to effectively attract FDI,
protect these investments, and insist that FDI is of such quality that
they contribute positively to their economies and the lives of their
people. This article considers whether the local content laws and
CDAs instituted to facilitate local participation are deterrents to FDI.
The focus of the article is not on the merits or otherwise of the investment promotion programs that West African governments adopt and
neither is it a comparative analysis of Ghana and Nigeria's investment
laws and policies. Its purpose is to assess local community engagement
with foreign investment in light of governments' investment promo7. The extent to which FDI contributes to economic development has been the subject of
much debate. See Xiaoying Li & Xiaming Liu, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth:
An Increasingly Endogenous Relationship, 33 WoRI u Div. 393 (2004); J. Benson Durham, Absorptive Capacity and the Effects of Foreign Direct Investment and Equav Foreign Portfolio Investment on Economic Growth, 48 Euni. E ON. Ri v. 285 (2004). See generally Till oi)oui H.
i INVESIMiNr
MORAN, EDWARO M. GRAHAM & MAONus BivOSrROM, Dot s FoRIioN DiR(
PROMOiv Di vitI OPMENi (2005); YINooi ANNIF Wit & V.N. BALASuBRAMANYAM, FoRt tN
Dim (-I INVI SrMi NI: Six CouNTRY CAsI Stuitt s (2004).
8. Odumosu, FDI Law and Policy in Post-Conflict Rwanda, supra note 5 at 181.
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tion law and policies. This article concludes with an outline of a research agenda that encourages further analysis of the impacts of
industry-local community agreements.

II.

LEGAL CATALYSTS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

African countries are currently being touted as attractive destinations for foreign investment.' In order to boost the perception of foreign investors, African governments enact favourable legal
instruments and institute investor-friendly policies. In spite of the focus on attracting FDI, the impacts of FDI on economic development
have received mixed reviews."o Rwanda, a sub-Saharan African country that has experienced a recent violent conflict and does not have
significant natural resources to possess substantial negotiating leverage, has adopted legal mechanisms as a means to attract foreign investment to its territory." Rwanda is not alone in this turn to legal
mechanisms for attracting FDI. The West African countries of Nigeria and Ghana have also engaged in significant legal reform of their
economies and foreign investment laws. While the goal of attracting
FDI might be laudable, there is a difference between FDI inflows
(quantity) and a sustainable private investment regime (quality). 12
This article investigates mechanisms adopted for increasing the quantity of FDI and also analyzes initiatives for ensuring that it is of such
quality that it positively impacts the lives of African peoples. Given
that government is not necessarily synonymous with people, one cannot fully measure the impacts of FDI without considering its effects on
the poor masses of Africa.
Many African countries have been working towards attracting FDI
since at least the inception of the structural adjustment programs,
adopting policies like liberalization, privatization, and deregulation. 3
They have also sought to attract FDI through tax and other financial
incentives, free trade zones, and investment protection promises. The
9. See ERNsI & YOuINo, Ir's TIMi FOR AFIwCA: ERNST & YoUN('s 2011 A[ RICA AT.
IRA riHVENI SS Sutzviy (2011).

10. See e.g. Samuel Adams, Can Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) help to Promote Growth
in Africa?, 3 Ai K. J. Bus. Moi. 178, 181 (2009) (noting that: "The review shows that SSA [subSaharan Africa] countries have been able to increase the inflow of FDI to the region in recent

times; however, the increase has not led to a corresponding positive effect of FDI on economic
development.").
11. Odumosu, FDI Law and Policy in Post-Conflict Rwanda, supra note 5, at 157.
12. Id. at 179.
13. For an analysis of structural adjustment programs in light of more recent programs of
international financial institutions, see Celine Tan, The Povert, of Amnesia: PRSPs in the Legacy
of Structural Adjustment, in Tiii

AND RIA

InIoN

Woiu 0 BANK AN)

Govi RNANCI: A Di CAmi

o

Ri ooRm

147 (Diane Stone & Christopher Wright eds., 2007).
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relevant legal mechanisms for attracting FDI include: constitutions
with constitutional guarantees of investment protection, domestic legislation that provide details of African governments' investment programs, one-stop investment centres that facilitate the establishment of
foreign investment, investment treaties, and treaty-created institutions
like the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID").
This part of the article presents a brief analysis of the legal mechanisms that are being adopted to attract and promote FDI in the West
African countries of Ghana and Nigeria." Liberalization and privatization are two of the overarching principles that drive economic reform in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Often, international financial
institutions actively encourage African countries to adopt these policies." From Ghana to Nigeria, the policies provide the impetus for

economic strategies including foreign investment promotion.
Privatization promises private sector-led growth with enhanced, but
sometimes more expensive, services that are sometimes priced beyond
the reach of many citizens of sub-Sahara African countries. By its nature, privatization leads to the transfer of government-owned enterprises to private entities, including domestic and foreign investors.
Liberalization of African economies and markets involve open liberal
trade and investment regimes, minimizing barriers to trade and investment, implementing policies to encourage FDI, and ensuring that restrictions on repatriation of profits, dividends and other returns are as
minimal as possible."6 Both policies are prevalent in Nigeria's economic agenda and strategies. In articulating the National Economic
Empowerment and Development Strategy ("NEEDS"), the Nigerian
government reiterated that liberalization and privatization are key
drivers of the framework by which it would achieve its goals." The
four key goals of the NEEDS program, "reorienting values, reducing
14. For detailed discussion of these legal mechanisms, see U.N. Conference on Trade &
Dev., Investment Policy Review: Nigeria (2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Nigeria]; U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Investment Policy Review: Ghana (2003)
[hereinafter UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Ghana].
15. See MiCHEL CHOSSUJDOVSKY, TiEi Gi oAuiATiON 01 POirVEY: IMPA IS o1) IMF AND
woi 0 BANK Ri-ioizms 111-122 (1997). For a detailed analysis of Tanzania's experience with
water privatization and inter alia, World Bank involvement, see Emma Saunders- Hastings, The
Asymmetrical Legalization of Investment Regimes in Africa: Lessons from Water Privatization,in
SusiAINAniu Divi i.oiMiNi IN Woni I)INvI srMiNi LAw 457 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger,
Markus W. Gehring & Andrew Newcombe eds., 2011).
16. On FDI, liberalization and capital controls, see Elizabeth Asiedu & Donald Lien, Capital Controls and Foreign Direct Investment 32 Woizi o Di v. 479 (2004).
17. Nigerian National Planning Commission, Meeting Everyone's Needs: National Economic
Empowerment and Development Strategy (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/scr/2005/cr05433.pdf.
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poverty, creating wealth, and generating employment,""are derived
from a three-fold focus on empowering people, promoting private enterprise, and changing the way the government does its work." Privatization and liberalization emerged as key strategies for achieving the
goals and meeting the focus of the NEEDS program.2 0 Nigeria's Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialisation) Act 1999 details
Nigeria's privatization program. 21 The Act in sections 9 and 12 respectively establishes the National Council on Privatisation and the
Bureau of Public Enterprises and lists the public enterprises for privatization and commercialization. Nigeria's privatization program has
been criticized for the low success rate of privatized enterprises and
not taking social justice seriously.2 2 Ghana has also articulated policies
that drive its macro-economy including issues related to FDI. 23 It pursued an active privatization program from 1988.24 The program proceeded in phases and faced some challenges, including "finding
strategic buyers" and concerns regarding benefits reaped from the
program.25
Without question, both Nigeria and Ghana have adopted the view
that divesting government interests in public enterprises and liberalizing the economy are worthwhile policies for growing the economy and
attracting FDI. As discussed below, these countries have enacted laws
to bring the FDI promotion policies into fruition. While these laws
have facilitated a perception that these countries are prepared to accept foreign business interests on terms that are widely-proclaimed by
African countries' economic advisors, the laws alone are not necessarily panacea for resolving the low levels of FDI flowing to African
countries. 26
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at ix.
Id. at x-xi.
Id. at 16.
Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Decree (Decree No. 28 of

1999) (Nigeria), available at http://www.nlii.org/files/privatisation.html.pdf. This statute was preceded by the Privatizationand Commercialization Decree (Decree No. 25 of 1988).
22. See Edwin Etiyebo, Privatizationin Nigeria, Social Welfare, and the Obligation of Social
Justice 2 J. EuoN. 37 (2011).

23. MLDIUm-Ti RM NATIONAL DEvtE rLOPMFNT Poicy FRAMIFWORK: GIIANA SIrAtRED
GRzowrTH AN) Drvar oPMFNT AGENDA (GSGDA), 2010-2013 (2010), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr2203.pdf.
24. See The Divestiture Program, http://www.dic.com.gh/div-prog/index.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2012 4:18 PM); Divestiture of State Interests (Implementation) Act, P.N.D.C.L. 326
(1993) (Ghana); Kojo Appiah-Kubi, State-owned Enterprises and Privatisation in Ghana 39 J.
Moor RN ArnR. Srol. 197 (2001).
25. UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Ghana, supra note 14, at 5.
26. See Khrushchev U.K. Ekwueme, Nigeria's PrincipalInvestment Laws in the Context of
International Law and Practice, 49 J. Ar rz. L. 177 at 204-206 (2005).
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Domestic Legal Initiatives for Attracting FDI in Nigeria andi
Ghana

Nigeria and Ghana adopt various domestic legal initiatives in order
to encourage and promote the establishment of FDI in their territories. Beyond establishment, the governments of these countries also
make legal provisions for the protection of FDI established in their
countries. These legal initiatives include constitutional protection, legislative enactments, and incentives including tax and other financial
incentives.
Constitutional protection often includes protection against expropriation/nationalization, an outline of compensation standards, and
protection against deprivation of property rights. The Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 ("Nigeria Constitution") provides for the protection of property, which includes both domestic and
foreign investment. 2 7 Section 44(1) of the Nigerian Constitution provides that:
No moveable property or any interest in an immovable property shall
be taken possession of compulsorily and no right over or interest in
any such property shall be acquired compulsorily in any part of Nigeria except in the manner and for the purposes prescribed by a law that,
among other things (a) requires the prompt payment of compensation therefore and
(b) gives to any person claiming such compensation a right of access
for the determination of his interest in the property and the amount of
compensation to a court of law or tribunal or body having jurisdiction
in that part of Nigeria.2 8
Section 46 permits judicial intervention in the event of an actual or
intended violation of this right and other related rights. 29 It is noteworthy that the protection from deprivation of property rights is one
of the fundamental rights constitutionalized in Nigeria."o Section 20
of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992 ("Ghana Constitution") also includes a fundamental right to the protection of property.' In Ghana, compensation must be prompt, fair and adequate.3 2
Section 36(4) of the Ghana Constitution specifically provides for the
encouragement of foreign investment in Ghana subject to domestic
law regulating investment in the country.3 3
27. COs- IetrION o THE FFI)ERAi Ri TmuBC o NIGi:RIA (1999), § 44, available at http://
www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
28. Id. § 44(1).
29. Id. § 46.
30. Id. § 44
31. CONSIIUiION o
in Ri PmI o
GilANA (1992), § 20, available at http://www.
judicial.gov.gh/constitution/home.htm.
32. Id. § 20(2)(a).
33. Id. § 36(4).
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Beyond the constitutions, these countries also enact investment promotion legislation and create investment promotion agencies. The
Ghana Investment Act, 1994, establishes the Investment Promotion
Centre which is charged with the role of encouraging and promoting
investment in Ghana.3 4 Ghana's Investment Promotion Centre expresses confidence in the country's ability to attract major investors."
The Ghana Investment Act encourages participation of foreigners in
Ghana's investment landscape.3 6 Its provisions are typical, including
clauses on benefits and incentives, guarantees against expropriation,
and definitions of circumstances under which the Government may
acquire investments upon "payment of fair and adequate compensation,"" unconditional transferability of profits and dividends, 3 9 and
arbitral forms of settling investor-state disputes.'o For its part, the
Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act ("NIPC Act") establishes the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission to "encourage, promote and co-ordinate investment in the Nigerian
economy.""1 The NIPC Act liberalizes the ownership of investment in
Nigeria,4 2 allowing foreign investors, subject to a few exceptions,4 3 to
"invest and participate in the operation of any enterprise in Nigeria."4 UNCTAD notes that "Nigeria adopted one of the most liberal
regimes in Africa for the entry of foreign investors, virtually opening
all its economy to FDI and reversing the severe restrictions on FDI
imposed by the 'indigenization' policy of the 1970s and 1980s."'I Like
Ghana's statute, unconditional transferability of profits and dividends,4 6 protection against expropriation, 4 7 and arbitral settlement of
34. Ghana Investment Act (No. 478) (1994), § 1-2, available at http://www.gipcghana.com/
publications/1318871581 Investment Law070627114453.pdf.
35. Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, First Quarter 2012 Investment Report, 8 The
GIPC Quarterly Update 1, (2012), http://www.gipcghana.com/publications/1336661671 Q1%
202012%201nvestment%20Report.pdf.
36. Ghana Investment Act § 3.
37. Id. § 23-25.
38. Id. § 28.
39. Id. § 27.
40. Id. § 29.
41. Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act No. 16 (1995) Cap. (N117), § 1, 4,
available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/Nigerian %201nvestment%20Promotion%20Commission
%20Act.htm.
42. See Ekwueme, supra note 26, at 177 ("The basic philosophy underpinning the NIPC
Act is liberal, open door policy to investments, and its aim is the stimulation of local and foreign
investments.").
43. Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act § 18.
44. Id. § 17.
45. UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Nigeria, supra note 14, at 23.
46. Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act § 24. See also Foreign Exchange
(Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Decree No. (17) (1995) Cap. (F34), § 15(4)
(Nigeria).
47. Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act § 25.
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disputes between the government and investors," are guaranteed in
the NIPC Act.
Tax and other fiscal incentives are also common as investment promotion initiatives. Nigeria grants tax holidays to industries with pioneer status,4 " tax relief for research and development, and extensive
incentives in free trade zones.o Sometimes, extensive fiscal incentives
are granted on a project-basis, a good example being the capital-intensive Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas ("NLNG") project.5 ' The Nigeria
LNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act provides extensive incentives for the NLNG project while also providing international arbitration for the settlement of investor-state disputes. 2 The
Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act is
another Nigerian statute that provides fiscal incentives to the companies that operate under production sharing contracts in the deep offshore and inland basin areas.
Ghana's Free Zone Act of 1995 establishes free zones in Ghana and
a Free Zones Board. 54 With the purpose of facilitating economic development and regulating activities in free zones in Ghana, the Free
Zone Act provides incentives to investors in free zones." Incentives
include exemption from paying income tax on profits for the first ten
years of a project, an income tax rate not exceeding eight percent after
ten years, and exempting shareholders from withholding taxes on dividends generated from free zone investments. 6 In addition to these
incentives, enterprises in free zones are guaranteed unconditional
transfer of profits, dividends and other funds," they are protected
from nationalization and expropriation," and they may have recourse
to international arbitration in addition to other dispute settlement
mechanisms." Additional incentives are available in other statutes,
48. Id. § 26.

49. See Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Act (1971) Cap. (179) (Nigeria), available at http://www.placng.org/lawsofnigeria/node/182.

50. See Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority Decree No. (63) (1992), §18.
51.

See Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentives. Guarantees and Assurances) Act No. 39 (1990)

amended by Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act No. 113 (1993).
52. Id.
53. See Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Decree No. (9)
(1999), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/DeepOffshoreAndInlandBasinProductionSharing
ContractsDecreel999.htm, amended by Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing
Contracts (Amendment) Decree No. (26) (1999). available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/Deep
OffshoreAndInlandBasinProductionSharingContracts(Amendment)Decreel 999.htm.
54. The Free Zone Act No. (504) (1995) (Ghana), available at http://www.gipcghana.com/
publications/FREE%20ZONES%20ACT%,201995%o20_ACT%20504_070627120415.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 28.
57. Id. § 30.

58. Id. § 31.
59. Id. § 32.
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including "tax holidays, capital allowances, locational incentives, customs duty exemptions and other inducements."s 0
Both Ghana and Nigeria adopt extensive incentive schemes in order
to attract foreign investment. The sustainability of these schemes has
been the subject of debate, with the incentives in Ghana's Investment
Act, being critiqued as follows:
The Ghana Investment Act, 1994, Act 478 provides no incentives to
local SMEs [Small and Medium Scale Enterprises]; the incentive regime only favours foreign direct investments to the disadvantage of
local SMEs. This, clearly, is an anomaly, which the new GIPC [Ghana
Investment Promotion Centre] law shall address. It will also be necessary to include SMEs in all PPPs and local content arrangements.61
On the domestic plane, Nigeria and Ghana are heavily invested in attracting FDI. In fact, Nigeria's current government attaches its foreign policy initiatives to attracting FDI.62 Following a brief discussion
of international investment promotion mechanisms, this article focuses on the extent to which local content initiatives and community
development agreements facilitate or inhibit the investment promotion agenda of the Nigerian and Ghanaian governments.
B.

International and Regional Investment Treaties

African countries, like other countries around the world, conclude
investment treaties. Many of these treaties are concluded with developed countries, but by 2008, African countries had concluded 335 bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") with other Third World
countries. 63 African countries account for twenty-seven percent of all
BITs.6 4 Like most African countries, Ghana has concluded BITs with
both developed countries and Third World countries.6 5 Its treaties include the traditional standards of treatment for protecting foreign investment and investors.6 6 Nigeria has also concluded several BITs
with both developed and Third World country-partners.6 7 The ratified
60. UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Ghana, supra note 14, at 29-30. See also Ghana
Inv. Promotion Ctr., Investment Incentives, Benefits and Guarantees, GIPC http://www.gipcg

hana.com/page.php?page=176&section=28&typ=1&subs (Last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
61. GSGDA, supra note 23, at 30.
62. Ahamefula Ogbu, Nigeria'sForeign Policy Now Tied to FDI,This Day Live Newspaper

(July 21, 2011), http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigeria-s-foreign-policy-now-tied-to-fdi/9541
8/.
63. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Economic Development in Africa Report 2010South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership (New York;

Geneva: United Nations, 2010) 91.
64. Id.

65.
66.
67.
note 14,

See UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Ghana, supra note 14, at 25-26.
Id. at 26-27.
For a list of Nigeria's BITs, see UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Nigeria, supra
at 28.
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treaties contain investment protection guarantees including national
treatment, most favoured nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, repatriation of investment and returns, and prompt, adequate
and effective compensation in the event of lawful expropriations. 68
Regional investment treaties are also becoming prevalent in Africa.
The Economic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS") Energy Protocol, 9 the South African Development Community
("SADC") Protocol on Finance and Investment ("SADC Finance and
Investment Protocol")7 ') and the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa's ("COMESA") Investment Agreement for the
COMESA Common Investment Area (CCIA) ("COMESA Investment Agreement"), 7 1 are examples of African governments' initiatives to include investment promotion and protection in their regional
integration efforts. Contents of these regional treaties vary with the
ECOWAS Energy Protocol being the most traditional and the SADC
Finance and Investment Protocol incorporating more economic development clauses and exceptions. Regional investment treaties and
other South-South investment treaties are potentially important instruments for African countries given the volume of FDI that is exchanged between regions or among African countries and their Third
World partners. In the first quarter of 2012, Ghana reports that Nigeria ranked second on its list of top ten foreign investors by the number
of registered projects.7 2 China, India, Lebanon and South Africa are
the other Third World countries on Ghana's list of top ten investor
countries by number of registered projects.7 ' African countries, with
exceptions like Angola and Libya, are also parties to multilateral treaties like the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention"). 7 1
68. Id. at 29.
69. ECOWAS Energy Protocol A/P4/I/03, Jan. 31, 2003, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/

en/protocoles/WAECProtocol English- DEFINITIF.pdf. ECOWAS states are also working
on investment promotion and protection through the Supplementary Act. Supplementary Act A/
SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on Investment and the modalities for its Implementation
within ICOWAS, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.privatesector.ecowas.int/en/III/Supplementary Act
Investment.pdf
70. Protocolon Financeand Investment, Angl.- Bots. - Dem. Rep. Congo - Lesotho - Mad-

agascar Malawi - Mauritius - Mozam. - Namib. - S. Afr. - Swaz. - Tanz. - Zam. - Zim, 2006,
http://www.sadc.int/english/key-documents/protocols/protocol-on-finance-and-investment/.
71. Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, COMESA Authority of Heads of State and Government, May 23, 2007, http://programmes.comesa.int/index.
php?option=com content&view=article&id= II &Itemid=149.
72. Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, supra note 35, at 2 (Nigeria ranks third on the list
of top 10 by the value of registered FDI projects).
73. Id.
74. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, 5 I.L.M. 532, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ ICSI D/StaticFiles/basicdoc/
CRREnglish-final.pdf. For a list of ICSID member states see, International Centre for Settle-
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The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 195811 also has a large African representation even
though countries like Angola, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and
Sierra Leone are not parties to the Convention.7 6
III.

FDI,

LOCAL ECONOMIES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES

As demonstrated in the foregoing discussion, the governments of
Ghana and Nigeria have adopted legal mechanisms to attract FDI. In
spite of these legal changes and other macroeconomic changes that
are being made, African peoples remain among the poorest groups of
people in the world. In order to address the gap between adopting
policies and laws that reflect prescribed 'best practices' and continuing
to face serious socio-economic challenges, several mechanisms are being adopted inter alia to addresses endemic corruption, revamp ailing
physical infrastructure, train regulators in order to ensure that they
acquire the much-needed capacity, and generally work towards democratic governance. Among these gap-filling exercises has been a specific turn to local content policies and legislation in some sectors of
West African countries' economies. Nigeria and Ghana have adopted
local content policies and legislation in the oil and gas industry. In
addition to government-led local content policies and legislation, private initiatives that foreign investors and local communities engage in
to facilitate the socio-economic development of these communities CDAs - are also garnering attention. Such initiatives are now common in various parts of the world, and following a discussion of local
content laws, the balance of this part of the article focuses on Nigeria
and Ghana's experiences with CDAs. The discussion here focuses on
the extent to which these initiatives effectively address the concerns of
local communities and whether responding to the concerns of these
communities in an effective manner is compatible with the investment
promotion and protection standards that many African governments
have overtly pursued. In essence, to what extent are initiatives that
incorporate the quest of local communities for agency and concrete
participation in decision-making, in addition to socio-economic develment of Investment Disputes, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention

(as of July 25, 2012), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=IC(SIDDoc
RH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language=english (158 states have signed the ICSID Convention and 147 states have ratified.).
75. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,

1958, 330 UNTS 3 (1959), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NYconv/XXIIIe.pdf.

76. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Status: 1958 - Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/

arbitration/NYConvention status.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
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opment, compatible with the active investment promotion and protection initiatives of West African governments?
A.

Government-Led Initiatives: Local Content Policies andl
Legislation

The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act
("Local Content Act") was enacted in order to ensure that Nigerians
benefit directly from contracts and employment in the oil and gas industry.77 The Local Content Act, which establishes the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board, regards compliance with
the Act and promotion of Nigerian content development as major criteria for the award of licences, permits and other interests in operations in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.78 The Act requires that
"first consideration" should be given to Nigerian independent contractors in the award of oil blocks, licences, and other contracts.
"Exclusive consideration" is to be given to "Nigerian indigenous service companies which demonstrate ownership of equipment, Nigerian
personnel and capacity to execute such work to bid on land and
swamp operating areas of the Nigerian oil and gas industry for contracts and services contained in the Schedule" to the Act.so Operators
must submit a Nigerian Content Plan," which must contain provisions
that ensure that first consideration is given to services provided in Nigeria and goods manufactured in Nigeria, and also ensure that Nigerians are given first consideration for training and employment in the
plan's work programme.8 2 The Act also requires operators to make
reasonable efforts to supply training for Nigerians where they are not
employed because they lack the requisite training" while also allowing, at the management level, for "expatriate positions to take care
of investor interests."" Employment at the junior or intermediate
levels is reserved for Nigerians." Other provisions include principles
for evaluating bids,8 6 technology transfer, 7 use of insurance brokers
registered in Nigeria," retaining the services of Nigerian lawyers or
77. Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, 2010, available at http://www.
ncdmb.gov.ng/images/DOWNLOADS/nc-act.pdf [hereinafter Local Content Act].
78. Id. § 3(3).
79. Id. § 3(1).
80. Id. § 3(2).
81. Id. § 7.
82. Local Content Act § 10(1).
83. Id. § 30.
84. Id. § 32.
85. Id. § 35.
86. Id. § 16
87. Id. § 44.
88. Id. § 49.
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Nigerian law firms with offices located in Nigeria,"' and financial services.o The schedule to the Act outlines the level of Nigerian content
required for activities and services and also sets the unit of measurement. The Local Content Act applies to "all subsequent oil and gas
arrangements, agreements, contracts or memoranda of understanding
relating to any operation or transaction in the Nigerian oil and gas
industry . . . ."91

The Local Content Act is a recent piece of legislation and the extent
to which its purposes will be achieved can only be measured after implementation. The extent to which the indigenous companies can provide the required services may determine the success of the
provisions. Also, indigenization was a major policy that Nigerian governments pursued in the 1970s but ultimately reversed in favour of
foreign investment following liberalization of the economy.9 2 Hence,
the extent to which the Local Content Act can be reconciled with the
foreign investment promotion focus of the government is a necessary
inquiry. In addition, Nigeria is a party to several investment treaties,
many of which require national treatment standards for foreign investment, and some of which prohibit some local content requirements.
Reconciling the provisions of the Local Content Act with these treaty
provisions should be an important research agenda in the coming
years.
Nigeria is not alone in the local content focus in the oil and gas
sector. Ghana's Ministry of Energy released the Local Content and
Local Participation in Petroleum Activities Policy Framework. 94 The
Ghanaian government's vision is "deploying an effective local content,
capacity development and local participation policy as the platform
for achieving the goals for the oil and gas sector with participation by
Ghanaian citizens in all roles, at all levels and in all activities relating
to the oil and gas value chain." 95 The policy directions resemble, to an
extent, the provisions in Nigeria's Local Content Act.9 6 First, all entities involved in Ghana's oil and gas industry are to incorporate local
content in their project development as well as have a Local Content
89. Id. § 51.
90. Id. § 52.
91. Id. § 6 (emphasis added).
92. See UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Nigeria, supra note 14, at 3-4 (discussing Nigeria's indigenization policy of the 1970s). See also Chibuzo S.A. Ogbuagu, The Nigerian Indigenization Policy: Nationalism or Pragmatism?, 82 Ai R. Ai i. 241 (1983) (a critique of
Nigeria's indigenization policy of the 1970s).
93. See, the discussion in part IV of this article.
94.

MINIS FRY or ENEIR(iY, Riei'i

ION IN Pr ruior ruijm A

irviiis

nei

oi

GHANA, LocAL CONT FNI AN)

LocAL PAR FIIn-

- Poricy FRAMI WORK (2011), available at http://www.energy

min.gov.gh/wp-content/upLoads/New-Local-Content-on-Petroleum-Activities.pdf.
95. Id. at 8.
96. Id. at 10-19.
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Plan.97 Second, Ghanaian independent operators receive first consideration in the award of oil blocks, lifting licences and contracts, where
they demonstrate capacity.98 Third, "as far as practicable," all operators in the oil and gas industry are to use goods produced and services
provided in Ghana.99 Where all else is equal, a preference for
Ghanaian entities is mandated.o For bids, where they are otherwise
equal, "the bid containing the highest level of local content shall be
selected."o' Fourth, the policy requires the employment and training
of Ghanaians with specific targets for different levels.10 2 Fifth, technology transfer is requiredi"" and sixth, measures are to be adopted to
support local capability development.' 0 4 The seventh policy directive
encourages the participation of women in the oil and gas industry. 0 5
Implementation of the policy directions through legislation is the
eighth policy direction' 0 6 and the ninth provides for the establishment
of the oil and gas business development and local content fund to "be
used primarily for education, training, research and development in
oil and gas." 0 7
Ghana's oil and gas industry and local content policy are fairly
new.'
This policy is being adopted at a time when the government is
actively seeking to attract FDI. To what extent are these reconcilable?
The oil and gas industry in African countries has a significant foreign
presence.' 09 With the increasing demand for energy resources all over
the world, it is unlikely that foreign oil and gas companies would refrain from investing in countries like Ghana and Nigeria because of
their local content policies and legislation. If any financial benefit
might be lost through local content laws, it is likely compensated
through financial and other incentives. In addition, if appropriately
managed and effectively executed, the local content laws have the potential to integrate the local economy with foreign investment activities. However, concerns remain about the arguable trade-distorting
tendencies of local content measures and their compatibility with in97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 11.
at 12.

at
at
at
at

14-15.
16.
16-17.
18.

at 5.

EVARIsmIUs

ANID INFIRNAIIONAi

Osmo1k AnlBo, Ri (Jm ATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN D)1[ SliC
Ri (Iimws: AN Al RI('AN CAsI Sruivy 7 (Univ. of Toronto Press 2009).
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ternational obligations. These concerns are discussed in part IV of
this article.
Private Initiatives: Community Development Agreements

B.

For several decades, many African countries have been involved in
mineral and petroleum extraction. While these natural resources have
been the source of significant revenue for some of these countries, a
recurring theme has been local community dissatisfaction with activities surrounding natural resource extraction, the disbursement of revenue from the exploitation of these resources, and general
dissatisfaction with the endemic poverty that has plagued some of
these countries and people. Sometimes, natural resource extraction
has contributed to factors leading to civil war in some African countries. 1 0 Hence, the story of foreign investment promotion is incomplete without navigating the complex social framework within which
FDI policies and laws are situated.
As a result of the intensity of some encounters between foreign investors and host communities, some African countries are becoming
more aware of the relevance of local community participation to the
socio-economic empowerment of African peoples. Foreign investors
also sometimes participate in initiatives that ensure that they acquire a
"social licence" to operate in these communities.'
Prominent among
these initiatives are the Community Development Agreements
("CDAs").' 1 2 Companies like Chevron and Shell have adopted the
Global Memorandum of Understanding ("GMOU") model of investor-community agreements in Nigeria."' Newmont has also con110. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 56 Oxford Econ.
Papers 563 (2004); Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume 1: Africa (Paul
Collier & Nicholas Sambanis eds., 2005); But see MAIIMoo MAMDANI, Wili N VilriMs Bi(oM!

Ku ii.is:

CoLoNIALism, NAnIVISM,

AND

iii

GNO(CIo)

IN RWANDA (Princeton

Univ.

Press 2001).
111.

See Katherine Trebeck, Corporate Social Responsibility and Democratisation:Opportu-

nities and Obstacles, in Earth Matters: Indigenous Peoples, the Extractive Industries and Corporate Social Responsibility 12-13 (Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh & Saleem Ali eds., Greenleaf
Publishing Ltd. 2008) (noting that "[g]ood corporate community relations, stakeholder engagement and consultation and efforts to meet particular community demands are therefore means
by which companies seek to improve reputation among those with the ability to impact operations, and thereby attain a social license to operate.").
112. See Sunrita Sarkar et al., Envtl. Res. Mgmt, Mining Community Development Agreements - Practical Experiences and Field Studies (2010) [hereinafter ERM, Mining CDAs].
113. On Chevron's GMOU's in Nigeria, see GMOU ParticipatoryStakeholder Evaluation:A
Joint Evaluation of the Global Memoranda of Understandingbetween Chevron, Community Organizations and State Governments in the Niger Delta (Oct. 2008), available at http://cbuilding.

org/sites/default/files/GMOUEvaluation

Final.pdf. For Shell's GMOU's, see Shell in Nigeria:

Global Memorandum of Understanding, available at http://www-static.shell.com/static/ngal

downloads/pdfs/briefingnotes/gmou.pdf (Apr. 2012). Oil producing companies in Nigeria also
adopt traditional philanthropic approaches when engaging with local communities. See Olatoye
Ojo, Nigeria: CSR as a Vehicle for Economic Development, in Samuel 0. Idowu & Walter Leal
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cluded CDAs with communities in the Ahafo mine community in
Ghana. These private initiatives, which involve a significant non-state
actor presence, are agreements between local communities and investors. Private initiatives are usually investor and/or local community
driven. Nevertheless, some of these instruments are not entirely privately formulated. Some are mandated by legislation.' 14
Broadly defined, CDAs are "any negotiated agreement between industry . . . and communities agreeing how these communities will ac-

cess development initiatives.""' When defined this broadly, CDAs
include GMOUs and Impact and Benefits Agreements ("IBAs").
IBAs are commonly used in northern Canada and are based on the
government's relationship with Canada's Aboriginal communities."16
GMOUs, which are used in Nigeria, are specific to the oil and gas
industry.'
Chevron and Shell use GMOUs which are successors of
the old Memoranda of Understanding."" They are somewhat philanthropic gestures couched in the form of agreements. GMOUs are essentially a social license to operate; a means of mitigating social risk in
Nigeria's Niger Delta.

Filho eds., Global Practices of Corporate Social Responsibility 393, 402-09 (Springer 2009);
Uwem E. Ite, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries: A
Case Study of Nigeria, 11 Corp. Soc. Responsib. Env't Mgmt. 1 (2004); Uwem Ite, Poverty Reduction in Resource-Rich Developing Countrics: What have Multinational Corporationsgot to do
with it?, 17 J. Int'l Dev. 913 (2005).
114. See, e.g., Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act (2007) Act No. (20), available at http://
faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/nig92382.pdf.
115. ERM, MINING CDAs, supra note 112, at 2.
116. On IBAs in Canada, see generally Janet Keeping, Thinking about Benefit Agreements:
An Analytical Framework (Northern Minerals Program, Working Paper No. 4: Canadian Arctic
Res. Comm. 1998); Irene Sosa & Karyn Keenan, Impact Benefit Agreements between Aboriginal
Communities and Mining Companies: Their Use in Canada, CANADIAN ENVTI. LAw Ass'N, Oct.
2001, http://s.cela.ca/files/uploads/IBAeng.pdf; Lindsay Galbraith et al., Towards a new
Supraregulatory Approach to Environmental Assessment in Northern Canada, 25 IMPACi AssFSIMhNT AND PIZni

cr APPRAISAL

27 (2007); Courtney Fidler & Michael Hitch, Impact Benefit

Agreements: A Contentious Issue for Environmental and Aboriginal Justice, 35 ENVIRONMI NIS
J., 49 (2007); Steven A. Kennett, CAN. INS F. o Ri s. LAw, ISSUES AND OPIONS FOR A PoLICY
I [OR no1 NORI I RN TiRi iIORIsS (1999) (prepared for
ON IMPAUI AND BI NI7 r ARnLMWN
the Mineral Res. Directorate, Dep't of Indian Affairs and Northern Dev.); Janet Keeping, The
Legal and Constitutional Basis for Benefits Agreements: A Summary, 25 Northern Perspectives
(1999-2000); Sandra Gogal et al., Aboriginal Impact and Benefit Agreements: PracticalConsiderations, 43 AIrA. L. Ri.v. 129 (2005); Ken J. Caine & Naomi Krogman, Powerful or Just Plain
Power-Full?:A Power Analysis of Impact and Benefits Agreements in Canada's North, 23 O(IANIZA

ION & ENV'i 76 (2010).

117. See Uwafiokun Idemudia, Oil Extraction and Poverty Reduction in the Niger Delia: A
Critical Examination of PartnershipInitiatives 90 J. Bus. Em cs 91 (2009). See also Anna Zalik,
Oil Futures: Shell's 'Trilemma Triangle' and the Force of Community' (Nov. 3, 2006), http://
globetrotter.berkeley.edulbwep/colloquium/papers/Zalik2006.pdf.
118. lbironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, An Alternative Investment Law Approach?: Analysis of
a Multi-Actor Investment Framework (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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Like other cases of community-industry agreements,"' CDAs are
not entirely new forms of agreement. While analyses of these instruments in the context of African countries is fairly recent, these agreements have been used in industrialized countries like Canada and
Australia, especially in relationships between Aboriginal communities
and mining companies for a longer period of time.1 20 Some CDAs are
(mostly) corporate social responsibility ("CSR") initiatives. In this article, the term CSR mostly refers to industry's service provision initiatives. CDAs are local agreements that often involve transnational
actors, thereby generating analysis that extends beyond local borders.12 1 CDAs purport to ensure benefit sharing.1 2 2 These negotiated
agreements incorporate provisions that determine how local communities will access development initiatives. They are most common in
the extractive industries. They are strategic community investment initiatives fostering social licenses to operate in host communities.1 2 3
Just as the contents of CDAs vary from agreement to agreement, the
impetus for CDAs varies across stakeholders. While local communities may support community development, they may be wary of CDAs
that may involve a long negotiation process and prefer "immediate
tangible benefits resulting from classic philanthropy."1 2 4 Governments may encourage CDAs, but may be reluctant where conflicts of
interest exist between the local communities and government.' 2 5 For
industry, it appears that there is recognition and even an embrace of
the notion that CSR initiatives are good for business. 12 6 However, it
119. See Natasha A. Affolder, Rethinking Environmental Contracting,21 J. ENVI.

L. &

PRAC. 155 (2010), for a discussion of environmental contracts.
120. See Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, Understanding Corporate-AboriginalAgreements on Mineral Development: A Conceptual Framework, in EARTH MATI RS: INDIGENOUS PiOPLES, IlH:
EXTRACTIVI: INDUSIRI!lS AND CORPORATE SOCIAl Ri sPoNSIBiLnay, supra note 111, at 67.

121. On CSR in international law, see Peter Muchlinski, CorporateSocial Responsibility and
InternationalLaw: The Case of Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises,in Till. Niw CouPORATI
Ac((o1NFA3IIrY: CORPORAIl SoCIAL Ri SioNsIIIIrY AND iint LAw 431, 432-33
(Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007); JINNIFLR ZIRK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SoIlA. RisI'oNsIBInusy: LIMITIONS AND OPPoRIUIeNES IN INTIRNATIONAL LAw (2006). See

Jarrod Hepburn & Vuyelwa Kuuya, Corporate Social Responsibility and Investment Treaties, in
SuSIAINAI.i

Di vIE.oPMiN

IN WORI ) INVIs IMENT LAw 585 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger

et al. eds., 2011), for specific commentary on CSR and foreign investment law.
122. ERM, MINING CDAs, supra note 112, at 11.

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 14.
126. See Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, Introduction in EARIII MA-rIs: INDIGI NOuS PiOr!I S,

iif
ExFRAIVIn INIMOSFRI S AND CORPORATE SonIAl RI w'ONSiBIIry supra note 111, at 3
("[A] quick check of the websites of most major companies operating in the extractive industries
will quickly reveal the widespread acceptance of CSR and the scale of activities and expenditures companies undertake to demonstrate their support for CSR principles."). Id. at 4 ("[Als
the risks of being sued increase and now involve multiple legal systems, many companies feel it is
better to use CSR policies to try to avoid problems that cause legal suits in the first place.").
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has been noted that government regulation of CDAs might not gather

as much industry support. 12 7
Many CSR initiatives are often philanthropic gestures, with the impetus for CDAs being "sustainable benefit sharing models" driven by
governments and civil society. 128 There is no single CDA model since
the needs and ideas of stakeholders vary across projects and regions.12 9 Government approaches to CDA regulation also varies. Depending on the country and the sector, CDAs may be mandated by
legislation or they may be voluntary. In Ghana, there is no legal requirement for CDAs although there are some CDAs in the mining
industry; however, it is reported that the country is seeking to include
community development programs in its policy framework."'o In Nigeria, The Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act of 2007, defines CDAs
and makes provisions for the contents of these agreements. Section
116(1) of the Act provides as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this section, the Holder of a Mining Lease,
Small Scale Mining Lease or Quarry Lease shall prior to the commencement of any development activity within the lease area, conclude with the host community where the operations are to be
conducted an agreement referred to as a Community Development
Agreement or other such agreement that will ensure the transfer of
social and economic benefits to the community.1 3 '
For inclusion in Nigeria's CDAs are issues like educational scholarships, technical training, employment opportunities, financial or other
support for the development and maintenance of infrastructure like
roads, water and power, assistance with the creation, development
and support of small scale enterprises, and marketing of agricultural
products. 1 3 2 The overarching theme of the CDAs is "undertakings
with respect to the social and economic contributions that the project
will make to the sustainability" of host communities.' 3 3 According to
section 117 of the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, CDAs are to
"specify appropriate consultative and monitoring frameworks between the Mineral title holder and the host community, and the means
by which the community may participate in the planning, implementa127. ERM, MINING CDAs, supra note 112, at 16.
128 Id. at 11.

129. The World Bank Group commissioned a consultant to draft a model Community Development Agreement Regulations. See James M. Otto, Community Development Agreement:
Model Regulations and Example Guidelines (World Bank Group Contract Number 7154096 -

Final Report) June 2010, http://www-wds.worldbink.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/2011/05/02/000386194_20110502032111 /Rendered/PDF/614820WPOP1 1781nalOReport
0June02010.pdf.
130. ERM, MINING CDAs, supra note 112, at 16.

131. Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, 2007, supra note 114, § 116(1).
132. Id. § 116(3).
133. Id. § 116(2).
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tion, management and monitoring of activities carried out under the
agreement." 13 4 The CDA model articulated in the Nigerian Minerals
and Mining Act adopts a classic CSR approach with a focus on service
provision.
While there is not yet a legal requirement for CDAs in Ghana's
mining industry, some industry partners adopt voluntary community
development initiatives.'1" The Newmont Ahafo project is a prominent example. Newmont, a transnational mining company, entered
into negotiations with the chiefs and people of the Ahafo Mine Local
Community in Ghana. 13 6 Over the course of about three years, CDAs
were developed and concluded with the communities. 137 The Ahafo
Social Responsibility Forum1 3 was created and three agreements
have been concluded - the Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement,' 3 1
the Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation Agreementi4 o and the
Ahafo Mine Local Community Local Employment Agreement.' 4 '
The Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement, signed in May 2008, is
an agreement between Newmont Ghana Limited and the chiefs and
peoples of ten community towns that comprise the Ahafo mine community.1 2 These are community towns "physically located on the
Mining Lease of Newmont Ghana Gold Limited," as well as communities and traditional areas with significant amounts of their traditional land covered by the Mining Lease, within the current area of
the Ahafo Mine Project's operational area.143 Through the Social Responsibility Agreement, which remains in force until the final surrender of the Ahafo Mine Mining Lease,"' the company commits itself to
sustainable economic and social development and the community is
134. Id. § 117.
135.

ERM, MININO CDAs. supra note 112, at 22.

136. Id. at 26.
137. Id. See Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation, 2009 Annual Report: Creating Sustainable Futures through Partnerships, 4, http://www.nadef.org/downloads/2/228.pdf (In the 2009
Annual Report of the Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation, it is reported that deliberations went on for over two years.).
138. Newmont, The Ahafo Social Responsibility Forum (ASRF), http://www.newmont.com/
features/our-communities-communities-features/The-Ahafo%20Social-Responsibility-Forum-A
SRF.
139. The Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement between the Ahafo Mine Local Cmty. and
Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd. (May 29, 2008), http://www.newmont.com/sites/default/files/social
resp-agreement-sign_08.pdf [hereinafter Social Responsibility Agreement].
140. Agreement between Newmont Ahafo Dev. Foundation and Newmont Ghana Gold
Ltd., (May 29, 2008), http://www.newmont.com/sites/default/files/social-resp-local-employment
agr-sign_08.pdf [hereinafter Development Foundation Agreement].
141. Agreement between Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd. and the Ahafo Mine Local Cmty. on
Local Employment, (May 29, 2008), http://www.newmont.com/sites/default/files/social-respon
develop-founda-sign-doc_08.pdf [hereinafter Local Employment Agreement].
142. Social Responsibility Agreement, supra note 139.
143. Id. at schedule 1, s. 1.
144. Id. § 1.
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committed to discussions and consultations with the company.145
Among the aims of the agreement are ensuring "sustainable development of the community", providing "for the establishment of the
Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation" and concluding a Local
Employment Agreement.' 4 6 It creates a forum with "oversight responsibility" for implementing the agreement with the governance
structure of the forum being covered over various sections of the
Agreement.14 7 In addition, the agreement establishes the Newmont
Ahafo Development Foundation.1 4 8 This Foundation is operational
with a website that details its activities including downloadable versions of its Annual Reports for 2009 and 2010.149 The dispute resolution provision of the Agreement, which excludes litigation and
arbitration as dispute settlement methods, is worth noting:
The parties further agree, acknowledge and confirm that this document does not create any legally enforceable rights to the benefit of
either of them and that all disputes or grievances of any kind arising
out of or related to this document or the policies described herein,
shall be settled through mediation and conciliation making use of the
Dispute Resolution Committee provided for in this Agreement. The
parties hereby renounce their rights to enter into any form of litigation
or arbitration on any disputes or grievances arising out of this
Agreement. 50
The Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation Agreement is an
agreement for the utilization of funds which sets out "the terms and
conditions under which Newmont shall fund the operations and objectives of the Foundation."'"' The Agreement outlines the Foundation's
funding sources. Central among these sources is Newmont's one U.S.
dollar for every ounce of gold that Newmont sells in its operations
under the Ahafo Mining Lease.15 2 Also included is one percent of
Newmont's net pre-tax income after some computing considerations."' The Agreement defines sustainable development, outlines
"acceptable sustainable development projects," and provides "guidelines for allocating funds" for projects.' 5 4 Ghanaian law governs the
Agreement and disputes not settled amicably may be submitted to ar145. Id. § 2.
146. Id. § 3.
147. Id. § 5.
148. Id. § 22.
149. NEWMONT AHAFO DEV. FOUND., http://www.nadef.org.
150. Social Responsibility Agreement, supra note 139, § 4.2 (section 23 provides for conflict
resolution management.).
151. Development Foundation Agreement, supra note 140, § 2.1.
152. Id. § 11.1(i).
153. Id. § 11.1(ii).
154. Id. §H 12-14.
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bitration in Accra, Ghana under the Arbitration Act of Ghana.'
Similar to the Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement, the Newmont
Ahafo Development Foundation Agreement will continue until the
Ahafo Mining Lease is surrendered.1 5 1
Like the Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement, the Ahafo Mine
Local Community Local Employment Agreement departs from the
arbitration option of the Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation
Agreement. By the Local Employment Agreement, which sets the
Company's policies regarding employment,'1 7 the parties renounce
their rights to settle disputes by litigation or arbitration.' 5 8 Instead,
they opt for mediation and conciliation.1 5 9
It is remarkable that these agreements, with the potential to generate enforceable rights that may be contested, do not permit litigation
and/or arbitration. Mediation and conciliation appear to reflect the
conciliatory nature of these agreements. While these dispute settlement methods are viable mechanisms for negotiating parties' interests,
they are not as confrontational as compulsory litigation or arbitration.
As a result, they have the tendency to appear less threatening, not
only to the communities, but especially to the industry participants
that are unlikely to favour overly confrontational dispute settlement
methods in CDAs. The extent to which these dispute settlement provisions are beneficial to the communities is yet to be fully determined.
The Local Employment Agreement sets out the general principles
for employing people. One of the major principles in this regard is
that the "company shall adopt a policy to ensure that at least 35% of
its national workforce in the Ahafo Mining Area, including contracEmployment of
tors," are citizens of the Ahafo Mine Community.'
skilled labour is to be based on applicants' qualification and experience as required by the company, while the company commits to
"make its best efforts" to employ only validated citizens of the community towns that satisfy its internal assessment criteria for the employment of unskilled labour.' 6'
The Newmont Ahafo CDAs, and the CDA model that the Nigerian
Minerals and Mining Act adopts, provide avenues for companies to
make benefit commitments to local communities. However, these
155. Id. § 21.
156. Id. § 18.1.
157. Local Employment Agreement, supra note 141, § 1.1.
158. Id. § 1.2.
159. Id.
160. Id. § 2.1(f) ("The Company shall use its best endeavours to increase the percentage to
50% within ten (10) years of commencement of gold production by the Company in the Ahafo
Mine Area.").
161. Id. § 2.1(a)-(b).
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agreements could constrain legal and social action that communities
may undertake in the event of dissatisfaction with companies' activities. Dispute settlement clauses in CDAs may constrain the legal avenues available to local communities, confidentiality clauses may limit
the extent to which communities can communicate with media and
civil society, and commitments to support the project may preclude
communities from some forms of opposition.16 2 As more of these
agreements are concluded, judicial decisions may help to further clarify the purview of the imposed limitations. Nevertheless, as formulated, the CDA model adopted in the Nigerian Minerals and Mining
Act and by Newmont in its relationship with the Ahafo community
towns is unlikely to deter foreign investors from investing in mining in
Nigeria and Ghana. This CDA model does not contradict the investment promotion focus of the Nigerian and Ghanaian governments.
IV.

SITUATING LOCAL CONTENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES IN FDI PROMOTION AGENDAS

Often, there is a tendency to separate government-led initiatives
and private arrangements between industry and local communities.
However, such an approach is not always apposite. It has been noted
that "[g]overnments should not assume they are helping business by
failing to provide adequate guidance for, or regulation of, the human
rights impact of corporate activities. On the contrary, the less governments do, the more they increase reputational and other risks to business."l63 Both local content initiatives and CDAs involve some
government presence, albeit, to varying degrees. In fact, in an era of
market-led growth that relies on strong governments that foster market initiatives, the lines between the public and private are increasingly blurred.
In adopting the law as a catalyst for attracting FDI, there is the
pressure to both ensure that the quantity of FDI increases and that
the local economy benefits from FDJ. But the question regarding the
162. O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 120, at 72-76.
163. Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Bus. and Human Rights, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights: Rep. of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-Generalon the Issue of Human Rights and TransnationalCorporations and Other Business Enterprises, Yf 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John

Ruggie). John Ruggie's work on human rights and business has been the subject of academic
commentary. See generally Tiu7 UN GuimSIN( PRINuIPLI S ON BuJSINEss AND HuMAN Ruia is:
FouNDAIoNS AND IMPeI MINTrAIoN (Radu Mares ed., 2012). On human rights and business,
see generally S1JRYA DIVA, Ri ou AIINO CORPoRAYE HuMAN Rimiii, VioLAIONS: Hi:MANIZ-

ING BusINIss (Routledge, 2012); Peter Muchlinski, Social and Human Rights Implications of
TNC Activities in the Extractive Industries, 18 TRANSNAT 'i CORPS., Apr. 2009, at 125; Peter
Muchlinski, Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the Regulation of International Business:
The Development of InternationalStandards by Intergovernmental Organizations,3 NoN-S I. AcoRs & INII L.123 (2003).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2012

23

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 [2012], Art. 5

88

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:65

extent to which governments' investment promotion initiatives fit with
active local content laws and CDAs remains. Do local content laws
and the CDA models adopted in Ghana and Nigeria, discussed earlier,
deter investment establishment or could they contribute to and foster
investment promotion? What do the FDI promotion initiatives, and
the local content and CDA initiatives, contribute separately and as a
combined whole to the socio-economic well-being of West African
peoples? The purpose of this part of the article is to demonstrate that,
rather than being at cross-purposes, these initiatives are unlikely to
deter FDI. As crafted, they are not radical instruments. Rather, they
are initiatives that seek to 'accommodate' local communities in a foreign investor-dominated framework. Two caveats are necessary in this
discussion. First, the local content legislation and policies might contravene some international that governments concluded to attract foreign investment without much attention to their impacts on local
communities. Second, CDAs require some extra commitments from
foreign investors; yet these agreements also provide foreign investors
with a social license to operate.
As noted in the introduction, this article does not examine the merits or challenges of the investment promotion mechanisms that Nigeria and Ghana adopt. It analyzes initiatives with potential for local
participation in light of investment promotion mechanisms. FDI has
the potential to provide significant benefits for local economies. However, if appropriate policies are not adopted, negative impacts of FDI
could be devastating for the local economy, peoples, and environment. Aspects of the local content legislation and policy in Nigeria
and Ghana respectively emphasize the employment and training of
local people. An educated workforce is both beneficial for African
countries and foreign investment. FDI is more likely to thrive in
countries with a highly educated workforce. In a similar vein, if properly executed, local content policies may also foster the development
of local entrepreneurs. More developed economies are more prone to
better absorb FDI and the existing mechanisms that facilitate local
business, such as financial regulations and dispute resolution systems,
may be highly beneficial for foreign investment. Lall and Narula express the view that:
[L]iberalisation has not always increased FDI inflows into host developing countries. The reason is simple. The removal of restrictions on
FDI does not create the complementary factors that MNEs need; it
only allows them to exploit existing capabilities more freely. Thus,
FDI response tends to be most vigorous where local capabilities are
strong when liberalisation takes place, and feeblest where they are
weak (of course, excluding resource extraction). Similarly, over time,
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FII inflows rise where local capabilities are strengthened and new
capabilities are created; they stagnate or fall where they are not.'
Local content laws and policies have the potential to foster both local
entrepreneurship as well as FDI (although they may be regarded as
discriminatory). The fact that more developed economies attract
more sustainable FDI supports this position. If local content policies
and legislation would indeed create stronger West African economies,
they are not incompatible on their face with an investment promotion
agenda. As well, Nigeria's Local Content Act appears to suggest that
its contents would only apply to subsequent investments in the oil and
gas industry.' 6 5 If this interpretation holds true, subsequent investors
would be able to include the local content requirements in their risk
and profits assessment before investing in the country.
However, as framed, contents of Nigeria's local content legislation
arguably contravene national treatment and other clauses in the country's investment as well as trade treaties. The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
("TRIMs Agreement") is one of the agreements that may be contravened.1 6 6 In fact, the United States, the European Union, and Japan
have expressed concerns about Nigeria's Local Content Act.1 67 The
WTO reports that "Nigeria maintained that the measures in question
complied with the TRIMs Agreement."'" Furthermore, it is reported
that Nigeria indicated that it had commenced bilateral consultations
with the United States and it would provide answers to the questions
that were raised. The TRIMS Agreement, in addressing national
treatment and quantitative restrictions, provides in article 2 that "no
Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions
of article III or article XI of GATT 1994." The Annex to the TRIMS
Agreement includes an illustrative list that provides for measures that
are inconsistent with the parties' national treatment obligations and
elimination of quantitative restrictions. UNCTAD interprets the measures outlined in the illustrative list to include local content require164. Sanjaya Lall & Rajneesh Narula, Foreign Direct Investment and its Role in Economic
Development: Do We Need a New Agenda?, 16 Enji. J. Di v. Ri s. 447, 449 (2004).
165. Local Content Act, supra note 77, § 6.
166. Wonio) TRAD ORGANI/ATION, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, in
Tim LiGA, Ti xis: Ti Risu'tis oI iiL URUGUAY RoJNo ov MtiIII.ATI RAt TR ADi NijoIAiEoNs 143 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). On TRIMs. FDI and development, see generally

U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Elimination of TRIMS: The Experience of Selected Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/6 (2007).
167. News item, World Trade Organization, Trade and Investment: Investment Measures
Questioned (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.wto.oig/english/news-e/newsll e/trim 03oct11 e.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
168. Id.
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ments.16 9 In terms of exceptions in the WTO Agreements, it is
unlikely that the exception in article 4 of the TRIMS Agreement,
which permits temporary deviation from the provisions of article 2 for
developing countries, would apply to Nigeria's Local Content Act.
In addition to the TRIMS Agreement, it is arguable that Nigeria's
Local Content Act violates national treatment provisions in its BITs.
Compliance with national treatment clauses in investment treaties
would be determined based on the language of each treaty. While
most treaties include national treatment standards, others modify or
exclude the standard. Incorporating some modifications, article 2(4)
of the Nigeria-Egypt BIT states that "either Contracting Party may
grant within the framework of its development policy to its own nationals and companies special incentives in order to stimulate the creation of local industries, provided they do not significantly affect the
investment and activities of nationals and companies of the other
Contracting Party.""o A similar clause is included in article 3(3) of
the Nigeria-United Kingdom BIT"' and in article 4(5) of the NigeriaGermany BIT.17 2 The extent to which these provisions are applicable
depends perhaps on the interpretation of "special incentives" that
"significantly affect" the investments and activities of foreign investors. In addition, some investment treaties also omit the national
treatment standard." 3 Irrespective of the requirements, as well as
modification and omissions of national treatment in some treaties, the
compatibility of local content legislation and policies remains a debatable issue in practice and in theory. This warrants a more nuanced
conclusion on the impacts of such laws and policies on perceptions of
investment promotion. While authors like Lall and Narula note that
"[i]t is difficult to see how host countries that have FDI can tap its
potential fully without such strategies as local content rules, incentives
for deepening technologies and functions, inducements to export and
so on" 1 7 4 others are opposed to the use of local content measures. 7 5
169.

U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Creating Business Linkages: A Policy Perspective,

11, UNCTAD/DIAE/ED/2009/1 (2010).
170. Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nigeria-Egypt, art.2, 9 4, Jun. 20, 2000, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
EgyptNigeria.pdf.
171. Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Nigeria-U.K., art. 3, 1 3, Dec. 11, 1990, 1658 U.N.T.S. 523.
172. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Republic of Nigeria
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Nigeria, Mar.
28, 2000, 2481 U.N.T.S. 344 art. 4, $ 5.

173. See generally Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen. The Significance of South-South BITs for the
InternationalInvestment Regime: A QuantitativeAnalysis, 30 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 101 (2010).

174. Lall & Narula, supra note 164, at 459.
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Essentially, while the treaty language varies from treaty to treaty, academics also present "diametrically opposed" views of the impacts of
these mechanisms."^7 The practical impacts of local content policies
are not without controversy. However, with regard to the issue that
animates discussion in this article - the compatibility of local content
laws and CDAs with FDI promotion measures in Nigeria and Ghana only time will tell whether these recently-enacted local content laws
contradict the FDI promotion measures in practice.
While crafting local content policies and legislation is largely within
the domain of governments, the other locally-focused initiative analyzed in this article - the CDAs - have a very visible private presence.
The Newmont agreements in Ghana and the provisions in the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, are unlikely to serve as deterrents to
foreign investment. To the contrary, these CDAs are at best favourable to foreign investment and, at worst, neutral instruments. If many
of the CDAs include provisions similar to the Newmont Ahafo CDAs,
these are unlikely to constitute overwhelming burdens for investors.
CSR initiatives are common, especially in industries like mining where
businesses engage closely with local communities. Negotiating agreements that require investors to provide about the same services as
they would under general CSR programs, while also extracting commitments from local communities not to disrupt investment activities
and projects, affords investors some significant benefits.
Some qualifications are necessary in this analysis. First, all CDAs
are not equal. Some would be more favourable to foreign investors
than others. As a result, these conclusions are limited to the CDAs
and CDA models analyzed in this article, that is, the Newmont CDAs
in Ghana and the model provided in the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act. Second, while CDAs could serve as an avenue for using private law as a catalyst for investing in African countries, it is arguable
that investors may not favour mandated CDAs. In this regard, it has
been noted that:
In regions that struggle with reduced capacity and a lack of resources,
stakeholders worry that, if the government were to institute overly
specific requirements regarding CDAs, these may function as obligation to industry to fulfill a service provision and development role that
should be the remit of the government. Ultimately this could reduce
the mining sector's willingness to invest in the country and reduce potentially associated development benefits.' 7 7
However, CDAs could be favourable to foreign investors as companies use them to acquire the consent of the local community to oper175. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev, supra note 169, at 10.
176. See id. at 11.
177. ERM, Mining CDAs, supra note 112 at 24.
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ate without disturbance. Often, these industry actors would engage in
voluntary service provision and other CSR initiatives and might not
acquire the goodwill of the community or the social licence to operate.
But with these agreements, the communities are committed to fulfill
their part of the bargain, which often includes a commitment to peaceful operations. It is in this sense that CDAs could be categorized as
investment. Some CDAs are essentially service and benefits provision
initiatives and some companies sometimes include these initiatives in
their policies whether or not they are reflected in commitments made
in agreements. Also, these CDAs appear less threatening since they
often exclude dispute resolution methods like litigation and
arbitration.
As currently framed, the CDAs discussed in this article largely resemble CSR initiatives. Time has taught us that CSR initiatives, especially those initiatives that focus on service provision, are not a
panacea for socio-economic development. Governments, and not industry, are ultimately the service providers. Research on communitycompany relations in gold mining communities in Ghana suggests that
communities and industry view impacts of projects as well as the benefits provided differently."17 Hence, the conflict between communities
and industry remains. As a result, the visible presence of a capable
government cannot be overemphasized. However, some communities
may prefer to avoid government involvement in CDAs.
While it is not the focus of this article, it is important to note that
CDAs might not always be beneficial to local communities.' 7 9 Without these agreements, the communities may still receive similar benefits from industry, but without the commitment that these benefits
would be forthcoming. Local communities would continue to have
the option to adopt legal avenues available in general laws if they disagree with some of the activities of industry operators. Hence, limitations on enforceability and a focus on service provision limit the
effectiveness of these agreements for local communities. Following
Simon et al., 1 so Idemudia and Ite distinguish negative injunction duties from affirmative duties:
The failure of oil companies to observe the moral minimum or
demonstrate that they are doing all they can do within their power to
observe this moral minimum has helped to reinforce community per178. Theresa Garvin et al., Community- Company Relations in Gold Mining in Ghana, 90 J.
ENVI. Mumi. 571, 583 (2009).
179. See Ken J. Caine & Naomi Krogman, Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full? A Power
Analysis of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada's North, 23 Oizo. & ENv'i. 76 (2010).
180. Uwafiokun Idemudia & Uwem E. Ite, Corporate-Community Relations in Nigeria's Oil
Industry: Challenges and Imperatives, 13 CoRP. So(. Ri'se. ENVII. MoMr. 194, 201 (2006) (citing
G.J. Simon, W.C. Powers & P.J. Gunnemann, The Responsibility of Corporationsand their Owners, in EiICAL TinovRY AN) BuSIN ss 60, (T.L. Beauchamp & NE Bowie eds., 1972)).
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ceptions of oil companies as adversaries to be confronted and tamed.
This is because no amount of road or bridge construction, provision of
electricity or the award of scholarships can compensate for 24 hours of
daylight resulting from gas flaring by the oil companies. At the same
time, such affirmative duties would not have the same effect on the
communities as the observation of negative injunction duties by the oil
companies. The issue being raised is that affirmative duties cannot be
a substitute for not observing the moral minimum. Affirmative duties
are likely to create more added values if negative injunction duties are
observed. 181

Without doubt, CDAs have the potential to facilitate economic development and ensure a focus on the quality of investment rather than
just the quantity. If governments place an unbalanced focus on the
quantity of investments, the local participation initiatives in place in
Ghana and Nigeria would be sufficient. But, if the ultimate goal being
actively pursued is ensuring that FDI is of such a quality that it fosters
the economic advancement of West African countries as well as the
socio-economic wellbeing of West African peoples, a rethink of the
CDA initiatives in Ghana and Nigeria is necessary. Truly holistic
agreements would require the involvement of governments, investors
and host communities and define the roles, rights and obligations of
the parties in this tripartite relationship.' 8 2 They would also include
dispute settlement provisions that demonstrate commitment to both
'affirmative' and 'negative injunction duties.'
V.

CONCLUSION:

A

RESEARCH AGENDA

FDI is a major provider of much needed foreign capital flows for
West African countries. Legal reforms of the Nigerian and Ghanaian
economies have involved a significant focus on foreign investment
promotion. At the same time, there is an increasing realization that
law and an overly narrow focus on government-foreign investor relationships are unable to completely answer questions regarding the
utility of FDI for local peoples in West African countries. All over
the world, and in West Africa, people are demanding initiatives that
are directly beneficial. With a turn to democratic forms of governance, West African governments are becoming increasingly aware of
the demands of their local communities. Hence, governments are simultaneously adopting seemingly incompatible laws for promoting
FDI and laws for local participation in the economy.
This article has demonstrated that the CDA models adopted in Nigeria s Minerals and Mining Act and Newmont's Ahafo projects in
181. Id. at 202.
182. See Odumosu-Ayanu, supra note 118, for the details of tripartite investment agreements, which I term "multi-actor investment agreements."

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2012

29

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 [2012], Art. 5

94

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:65

Ghana do not appear to be deterrents to FDI. The local content laws
warrant a more nuanced conclusion, with the evidence not being conclusive with regard to the impacts of measures of this nature on FDI
promotion in practice. Having made these initial findings, there is
room for research on how these initiatives impact local communities
in these countries and what contributions they make to both domestic
and international laws on foreign investment. Given that local content requirements have been the subject of more sustained attention,
this article calls for more research focus on CDAs. While instruments
like the Impact and Benefits Agreements in Canada have enjoyed
some research focus, the CDA models in West African countries, are
less well-researched. From the GMOUs in Nigeria's oil and gas industry, the CDAs required in Nigeria's mining legislation, to CDAs in
Ghana's mining industry, it is important to turn a critical lens to these
agreements and examine their contents, the process of their negotiation, and their impacts on local peoples in West African countries.
The fact that they do not necessarily act as deterrents to FDI does not
suggest that the best models for all parties involved, especially the local communities, are being adopted. Perhaps, the current limited
CDA model adopted in West African countries could provide the impetus for truly holistic legal arrangements that take West African peoples interests and perspectives more seriously.
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